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provide both non-military and military options designed to meet US political objectives while fostering cooperation and stemming the spread of anti-American sentiment.
Iraq's Threat To Vital US National Interests
The Strategic Environment
The US possesses an unprecedented advantage in military and economic power and influence in the world today. Despite this advantage, for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union, US citizens abroad and at home feel vulnerable to attacks on the homeland perpetrated by terrorists and rogue states. The destruction of the World Trade Center triggered the realization that US enemies have the reach and ability to threaten the American way of life. As the world grows smaller through cheaper and faster modes of travel; open borders; and the interconnectivity of information, financial and economic systems, democratic nations will become more vulnerable to asymmetric WMD or cyber attacks. The release of a biological agent in a major city, the detonation of a nuclear weapon, or cyber attacks against core US infrastructure systems could kill millions of people and cost billions, or perhaps, trillions of dollars. As the September 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) states, "We [the US] are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of an embittered few." 7 The new NSS policy for dealing with transnational or rogue state threats is clear: "the US will prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, our friends, with weapons of mass destruction."
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US National Interests
Before discussing options and solutions to the Iraqi problem, it is important to determine whether Iraq is truly a threat to US vital interests. Let's start with a definition of vital interests.
There are several sources that attempt to define national interests. A succinct definition was selected from the 1999 NSS. Developed by the Clinton administration, the NSS defined vital interests as interests of "broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of our nation." Specifically, these interests include US physical security and economic well-being.
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The Iraqi Threat
With vital interests defined, the next question is does Iraq's possession of WMD pose a threat to US physical security and economic well-being? If so, is the threat imminent?
Answering these questions is problematic because of the difficulty in assessing Iraq's WMD 12 and is developing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with a range of 800 km. 13 Most disturbing is the evidence that Iraq continues to actively seek nuclear-weapon technology and fissile materials, including uranium from Africa.
14 If Iraq acquires fissile material, it could possess a nuclear weapon in one to two years. 15 If Iraq is forced to produce the material internally, weapon development could take up to five years. possessed a nuclear weapon. 18 This indicates Hussein views the nuclear weapon as critical to any future military success. There is also some concern Hussein will arm Al Qaeda with WMD. This is unlikely for three reasons: (1) if the attacks were traced back to Iraq, America will likely respond with military action that will jeopardize his survival; (2) he mistrusts Usama Bin Laden, who sought permission from Saudi Arabia to attack his country after the 1990 Kuwaiti invasion;
and (3) Hussein and the Ba'ath party are secular and have little liking for Islamic fundamentalism. A CIA report signed by the deputy director, John McLaughlin supports this premise: "Baghdad for now appears to be drawing the line short of conducting terrorist attacks"
and "Hussein will more likely use WMD for blackmail, deterrence, or otherwise as his arsenal grows." 19 After careful consideration of Hussein's survival instincts and the fact he is probably a year or more away from obtaining a nuclear weapon, I conclude that it is not likely he will attack in the near term. Thus, Iraq does not pose an imminent threat to US interests.
In the longer term, following Hussein's acquisition of a nuclear weapon, the threat to US security and economic well-being becomes more plausible. Despite more than a decade of economic sanctions and blockades, Hussein has made steady progress toward acquiring a nuclear weapon. Three billion dollars a year, illegally acquired through surcharge-kickback deals outside the UN Food-for-Oil Program, was available to purchase equipment and technology used in weapon development. This equipment was smuggled through porous neighboring borders.
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Iraq's acquisition of a nuclear weapon would provide an asymmetric capability that could create In order for the US to achieve its political objectives in Iraq without permanently damaging its international position, it should consider implementing a sustained public diplomacy campaign. This campaign should convey a respect and appreciation for other cultures and ideas; a willingness to engage in serious dialogue on the issues; and a commitment to resolve the crisis under the UN umbrella. As discussed earlier, the US does not face an imminent threat to its national security until Hussein obtains a nuclear weapon. While it is generally agreed that deterrence will not stop Hussein from achieving his objectives, there is time to make a good faith effort through the UN to avoid military intervention. Taking this approach will legitimize US efforts, reaffirm US commitment to work within the international system, strengthen US credibility and build support for a coalition if military action is necessary by the winter of 2003.
Options Short of Military Intervention
There are non-military options still available for making a legitimate attempt to resolve the Iraqi crisis in the next year. The problem is, short of negotiating an exile agreement with Hussein, most non-military solutions provide little hope for achieving the objective of regime change. The administration recently signaled a willingness to allow Hussein to remain in power if he complies with the 16 UN resolutions, to include verifiable disarmament. Whatever is decided, it is important to consider how adept Hussein is at working around sanctions and hiding WMD, and the difficulty in assuring that UN member nations uphold the sanctions.
Diplomatic Options
After 10 years of intransigent behavior by Hussein toward the world community and brutal treatment of his people, it is difficult to imagine a diplomatic solution as either possible or desirable. But to gain international legitimacy, build a worldwide coalition and reduce antiAmerican sentiment around the world, the US must give the UN one last chance to use coercive diplomacy to compel Hussein into disarming his WMD programs. UN Security Council members are working on a new resolution that calls for Iraq to reveal all materials relating to WMD and to give unfettered access to all key buildings.
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The problem lies in reaching agreement on the toughness of the sanctions, including whether palaces are fair game for inspections. Britain and the US also want this new resolution to give the UN immediate authority to use any means necessary (to include force) if Hussein obstructs inspections. France and a number of other countries do not wish to give this authority in the first resolution and are insisting "all means necessary" will require the passing of a second resolution after Hussein is given the opportunity to comply. 32 Since Hussein is a year or more away from obtaining a nuclear weapon, there is room to compromise. The US should support the French version of the resolution with the agreement that if Hussein does not comply with the new resolution within six months, a second resolution will immediately go before the Security Council for a vote. It is again important to recognize that in the unlikely event Hussein agrees to unfettered inspections, the US objective of regime change may not be achievable.
There is one diplomatic option that could achieve disarmament and a regime change--the exile of Hussein and his family. While the idea of Hussein retiring to an island paradise may seem inappropriate or unpalatable, a successful exile meets both political objectives. The best course of action is to broker the exile agreement though a third country such as Russia or France.
The potential shortfalls of such an agreement include who will assume power once Hussein One area where the US can leverage economic incentives is with Russia, which continues to support France's effort to limit the scope of the new UN resolution currently on the table.
Russia believes that if Hussein is removed from power and the US establishes a pro-Western regime in Iraq, Russian oil companies may take a backseat to American businesses. 35 The US should provide Russia some incentives and assurances that support for regime change will result in economic rewards and a substantial role in the reconstruction of Iraq.
Informational Options
According to Joesph Nye, "power is the ability to affect outcomes" 36 and proper dissemination of information is an alternate source of power that can "shape the preferences of others." The US must exploit informational outlets such as satellite TV, radio, newspapers, and psychological operations capabilities to reverse anti-American sentiment in the Arab world.
Some of this problem resides in simply getting a better message out to the Arabs. The administration needs to craft "Arab-sensitive" speeches and avoid inflaming Arab opinions.
Constant talk of unilateral military action, and sound bite phrases like "axis of evil" and "dead or alive," plays well to domestic audiences, but cause shock and concern in the Arab world. It makes them wonder, "does the US respect the sovereign rights of countries who dissent?"
American statesmen and diplomats need to appear on overseas media outlets like al Jazeera to discuss the positive virtues of US Middle East policy.
American propaganda outlets such as Voice of America must continue to transmit messages to Iraqi citizens and soldiers to let them know America stands for their freedom. It should also be clear that if they remove Hussein from power, America will support and aid Iraq in re-establishing a free society, predicated on the values most cherished by the Iraqi people.
Achieving American Political Objectives Through Military Intervention
Carl Von Clausewitz, the German military theorist once wrote, "War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means." 37 If diplomatic and other non-military instruments of power prove unsuccessful in compelling Iraqi WMD disarmament, and assuming Hussein continues to make progress towards acquiring a nuclear weapon, little choice exists but to intervene militarily to achieve WMD disarmament and regime-change objectives. 
Military Strategic Setting, Capabilities and Vulnerabilities
The conduct and character of a second major confrontation with Iraq is likely to take on different dimensions and pose some new operational and political constraints on coalition forces. 45 Large stockpiles of pre-positioned hardware and supplies, and the current presence of 60,000 personnel, 300-plus aircraft, and 275-plus tanks and armored personnel carriers provide a solid baseline for action. 46 The impact of chemical weapons on coalition forces is an operational concern, but, since Concerns about the war spreading to Israel or other countries are legitimate if Hussein is able to launch ballistic missile attacks. In the Gulf War, coalition ability to track, target and destroy mobile targets was low; however, with the introduction of UAV intelligence and attack platforms, tracking and destroying mobile targets will improve significantly.
Finally, a primary complicating factor that requires US protection is the Iraqi citizens.
Widespread harm to Iraqi citizens will generate a world public opinion backlash. If Hussein hunkers down in Baghdad and other major cities, the coalition must work with Arab nations to conduct information operations designed to draw citizens out of the cities into refugee camps.
Under Arab control, these camps will protect Iraqis from urban warfare effects and provide a pool of citizens for the opposition army. Hussein may attempt to stop citizens from leaving the cities; however, this is unlikely due to the increased risk of fueling an internal uprising.
Military Objectives and Iraqi Centers of Gravity
Based on the stated political objectives and an analysis of the military strategic environment, capabilities and vulnerabilities, coalition forces should adopt the following military objectives: (1) develop a viable Iraqi opposition force; (2) gain air superiority and render Iraq's air defense system ineffective; (3) severely degrade Iraq's ability to deliver WMD; (4) prevent the conflict from spreading to neighboring countries; (5) render the Iraqi armed forces ineffective; (6) minimize Iraqi citizen deaths and casualties; (7) seize territorial control of Iraq;
and (8) First Gulf War. The differences are mainly driven by different political objectives. Avoiding these targets will minimize Iraqi civilian suffering, gain favorable media coverage for world consumption and reduce reconstruction costs after the war--all vital for achieving a lasting peace.
Strategic Concept
The selection of military objectives and COGs was based on the assumption that Iraq will attempt to fight a war of attrition, focused on maximizing casualties through the use of WMD, and drawing coalition forces into an urban warfare environment. Below is an analysis of each military objective, to include how military forces will execute the strategy, the resources required and how successful outcomes will contribute to achieving political objectives.
Develop a viable Iraqi opposition force: The Bush administration recently authorized the training and equipping of 10,000 Iraqi exiles to assume roles as battlefield advisors, interpreters, forward spotters for laser-guided bombs, and military police. 47 If these exiles were also to receive urban warfare training, when aided by air power and led by special operations forces, they can potentially take the fight into Baghdad if Iraqi forces hunker down. In addition to performing military functions, exiles can lend legitimacy to the coalition effort by involving themselves in enemy surrenders and the leading of friendly forces into liberated towns and villages. The two main challenges to this initiative are achieving credible combat-readiness and resolving potential conflicts between factions seeking power in a post-Hussein government.
Obtain air superiority and render Iraq's air defense system ineffective: One of the first priorities in this campaign is to gain air superiority and destroy Iraqi air defenses in order to provide coalition forces freedom of movement, both in the air and on the ground. 
Potential Results
There is a wide variability in the potential length and cost of this conflict based on how events unfold. A successful military operation may be defined as meeting the political objectives, mitigating the effects of chemical and biological weapons on friendly forces, preventing a spread of the war outside Iraq, and avoiding undue pain and suffering to the Iraqi people. Risks are present in all these areas and have been discussed extensively throughout this paper. Coalition leadership must continually assess the situation and adapt to any obstacles the to media and public pressure to end the conflict early, exert military pressure on the city through discriminate air strikes and special operations incursions, enforce an airtight economic and arms embargo, apply diplomatic pressure, conduct successful psychological operations, and incite internal uprisings, the regime will eventually fall via coup, exile agreement or outright surrender.
Once Hussein is removed from power, coalition nations have a responsibility to leave Iraq with functioning institutions, to include a military force strong enough to protect Iraq's oil reserves and sovereignty. The war-termination and post-conflict phases of this campaign must focus on building a lasting peace. This is no easy task in Iraq, where current government officials and several ethnic and exiled groups will seek prominent roles in the new government.
Immediately following regime collapse, eliminating security threats, establishing humanitarian operations and forming a democratic, power-sharing government will be the highest priorities. Coalition forces should initially take responsibility for maintaining law and order and, with the help of non-governmental agencies, arranging for and distributing humanitarian aid. To ensure legitimacy and world buy-in, UN and Arab nations must assume responsibility for establishing a new government and the formation of a UN police force to conduct Arab-led peacekeeping operations. Establishing a stable government inclusive of the three main ethnic groups--Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, and determining whom to leave in power from the current regime will be complex and challenging. 49 Arab countries with ties to these groups must pressure them to non-violently participate in a power-sharing agreement. 
Conclusion
After a careful analysis of this complex national security issue, it is clear that Hussein will represent a threat to US security and economic well-being once he obtains a nuclear weapon in the next one to five years. Hussein's refusal to comply with 16 UN resolutions and his tenacity in holding out after 11 years of economic sanctions, provide little hope for achieving the US political objectives of WMD disarmament and regime change via non-military instruments of power. Despite the grim prospects, time exists for the US to work within a legitimate UN framework to make one last attempt at reaching a diplomatic solution. The US must resist engaging Iraq unilaterally, as this will only increase international tension and fuel anti-American sentiment around the world. The US should adopt the French UN resolution proposal, but work to attach a time limit of six months for Iraqi compliance. If Iraq complies with the new inspection conditions, the US should drop demands for regime change. If Iraq fails to meet the mandate again, the UN Security Council should swiftly pass a second resolution authorizing force. By working within this framework and conducting a rigorous public diplomacy campaign to quell anti-American sentiment, domestic and international support for coalition-based military action will grow. This could set the stage for a military intervention by the winter of 2003.
As the US makes a legitimate attempt to solve the crisis diplomatically, preparations and plans should continue for solving this problem militarily. There are significant risks to conducting operations against Iraq, as Hussein is likely to use all means necessary to ensure his regime survival. The first task is to build a coalition that includes the Arab nations. As Gulf War experience shows, this is a winning formula. Coalition plans must focus on minimizing coalition casualties, preventing the spread of the war to neighboring countries, avoiding a humanitarian disaster in Iraq, and ensuring that the groundwork is laid for a lasting peace.
Neutralizing Hussein's WMD and missile delivery systems early and avoiding entanglement in an urban battle are critical to the success of this campaign. With patience, coalition forces will strangle Hussein and his forces, leading to regime change and WMD disarmament.
Finally, the most difficult task with regard to Iraq may be establishment of a lasting peace.
Ethnic groups such as the Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds must broker a power-sharing agreement so
Iraq may reach its true potential. Iraq's human capital and oil reserves provide a solid foundation for an American-friendly regional power. A friendly Iraq could ensure stability and the free flow of oil in the Middle East, while serving as beacon for democracy in the Arab world--all of which serve US national interests. 
